This note discusses key challenges in Argentina, where multiple exchange rates have been the norm since 2019, focusing on conditions and timing for exchange rate liberalization and drawing lessons from Egypt's recent successful experience.

President Trump aims to boost U.S. oil production, but the industry s capacity to do so is uncertain. This analysis explores regulatory actions a Trump administration could take, like easing permits and rolling back policies, though market complexities may limit production growth.

This note explores trends in U.S. labor productivity compared to Europe, the relative contributions of key sectors to economic growth, and the role of AI in potentially influencing these dynamics.

A weaker $CNY under a Trump 2.0 presidency would have spillover effects on other EM-Asia currencies. Our analysis indicates that MYR and KRW are more sensitive to $CNY movements, while VND and TWD may be able to mitigate some negative impact as beneficiaries of supply chain diversification.

This report examines why US bond yields are rising despite Fed rate cuts, highlighting increased productivity lifting the neutral real rate, fiscal dynamics raising breakeven inflation and the term premium, and stronger economic data shifting up expectations for the December 2025 Fed Funds rate.

The current state of Europe indicates that the focus of Mario Draghi s report on European competitiveness, investment, innovation, technology, and structural reforms are core to Europe s growth challenge.

The ECB’s current situation truly calls for the "two-handed economist". On the one hand, they have room to lower rates further given low GDP growth, particularly in Germany. On the other hand, inflation remains sticky above the 2% target, labor markets remain relatively tight and growth uneven.

The export channel from devaluation remains a positive force for EM one we think is underappreciated at the current juncture.

Non-resident portfolio outflows from EM have been large, amounting to a five standard deviation shock in March and April.

The COVID-19 shock has meant a sharp sudden stop for emerging markets, with our daily tracking of non-resident portfolio outflows at unprecedented levels.

Many EM currencies have fallen sharply in recent years, including the Turkish Lira, Colombian Peso and Russian Ruble.

Slowing jobs growth is adding to already elevated recession fears. We show that recent slowing is consistent with a longer-term trend, reflecting the gradual tightening in the labor market over years. Slower jobs growth is therefore a symptom of a maturing labor market, and should not be interpreted as a signal that US recession is rising.

Markets have been anxious about the global growth outlook for some time, with weak manufacturing data interacting with trade tensions to dim sentiment. Amid the gloom, we detect early signs that manufacturing may have troughed, and that adverse spillover to investment, important for future growth, is limited. Combining this growth picture with material easing from key central banks, paints a relatively constructive backdrop for risk assets, including EM FX.

There is growing concern over disruption to global supply chains, given the now multiple rounds of tariffs in the US-China trade dispute. Despite all this, China’s current account and trade surplus look robust. This resilience is partly driven by a shift in the composition of exports away from the US and towards destinations like ASEAN and the Euro zone.

Mounting trade tensions are putting depreciation pressure on the RMB. We investigate contagion risk to the rest of EM from further RMB weakening. During the surprise RMB devaluation in august 2015, commodity currencies like the Russian Ruble and Colombian Peso were hit most, as markets traded weaker global growth and thus falling commodity prices. We see this as a good template for possible contagion effects now.

The sharp drop in the Peso reflects another BoP "sudden stop," which is likely to carry far-reaching consequences for the economy. The IMF forecast of -1.3% growth in 2019 assumes a recovery in H2, but that is now unlikely and a number at or below -2.5% is conceivable. As a counterpart to this, current account adjustment will accelerate, with the Peso now significantly undervalued in our fair value model.

US tariffs should be imposing a strain on China’s balance of payments, most obviously in the current account. But the surplus is rising, in part due to quite healthy exports. Instead, trade tensions may be manifesting in capital outflows, which are above 2012 levels and half 2015/6 levels. Tariffs may be raising RMB depreciation expectations, an issue of great importance to China’s policy makers and the rest of EM.

US tariffs are exerting depreciation pressure on the RMB, which we think could ultimately drive $/CNY well above 7.00. One illustration of that depreciation pressure is a $/CNY rate now back in the upper (weaker) half of the band around the fix. Another visualization are large residuals in our fixing model, which point to policy makers keeping RMB temporarily strong.

Currency tensions among advanced countries are on the rise, driven by the perception that the US Dollar could be overvalued. We now use our currency valuation framework to examine US Dollar valuation, and look today at the size and composition of the US current account. The US current account deficit is almost entirely (80%) with China. Dollar overvaluation, if it exists, is therefore mostly versus EM Asia.

Speculative positioning in the CFTC’s CoT report shows Dollar longs have scaled back sharply and are only modest at this point. Data from option markets suggest positioning may even be modestly short the Dollar versus the Euro. After many years of large Dollar longs in the foreign exchange market, we read these data as saying Dollar positioning is now essentially flat.

Despite the shift in the Fed's stance, the Dollar has refused to fall versus the rest of the G10. One reason is that other central banks are also shifting dovish, which limits the scope for interest differentials. Another is that the importance of rate differentials as a driver of FX has fallen, such that the dovish Fed shift now carries less signal for the Dollar. The Dollar is "stuck," a dilemma for policy makers who want a weaker currency.

Since the height of the Lira and Peso sell-off in August 2018, both currencies have weakened sharply in real effective terms. While both have seen their current account deficits narrow sharply, this is mostly due to cyclical weakness and not genuine rebalancing. This is why our FX fair value model signals that both the Lira and Peso are only fair and not undervalued.

A common opposing view to our nonsense output gap series is that employment has almost fully recovered, so how can a substantial amount of labor market slack remain? Rising labor participation among women flatters the picture, which we filter out by looking at prime-age male employment. Our work points to still significant slack in Spain, Italy and Greece.

Real money flows into EM stocks and bonds have surged recently, perhaps in anticipation of a benign outcome to China-US trade talks. Our daily tracking estimates flows into non-China EM at $23 bn in Q2. Our measure of China’s "core" current account surplus remains healthy, but additional US tariffs could tip the balance and cause RMB to fall.

Our global growth tracker has fallen to its lowest levels since 2015, driven by a sharp drop in manufacturing sentiment around the world. The evidence points to normal ups and downs in global manufacturing, with some early signs that hard-hit places like Germany are turning up.

Euro periphery current account balances have almost all swung into surplus, which is often cited as positive evidence that competitiveness has been restored. But the swing to current account surplus has a big cyclical component due to still large output gaps in some cases. Adjusted for slack, Euro periphery current accounts are mostly still in deficit.

Phillips curves provide a useful lens through which to look at output gaps, since they link the degree of economic slack to the pace of underlying inflation. Estimates for structural unemployment in the Euro periphery look too high given how low inflation historically, which supports our earlier analysis that Euro periphery output gaps remain large.

We test whether Euro periphery output gaps are too narrow given weak or negative growth. If we allow for sizable 2008 GDP drops and slower trend growth since, we estimate periphery output gaps that are often twice as large as consensus numbers.

Small output gap estimates for the Euro periphery make little sense, because they embed an assumption of negative trend growth post-2008. We derive Euro periphery output gaps which are consistent with Phillips curve evidence and help explain why core inflation has remained so low on the periphery.

Last year we unveiled a new measure of genuine FDI flows to EM which strips out reinvested earnings to focus only on "true" FDI flows. This measure of "true" flows has fallen to its lowest level in 20 years, a global FDI shortage that impacts emerging as well as frontier markets.

We unveiled a new EM positioning database late last year. Here we provide a further breakdown into equities and bonds, which allow us to zero in on the biggest EM positioning overhangs. The largest overhang, South Africa, is due to both in equal measure.

Markets spent 2018 debating if Turkey and Argentina are idiosyncratic, and the same debate is playing out now given the recent market sell-off. Our daily tracking of real money flows highlights broad-based weakness, where we see the EM positioning overhang as one underlying theme.

We scan across EM for where – besides Turkey – growth is heavily credit dependent. Colombia, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil and Poland have growth heavily linked to credit.

The Fed has undertaken a remarkable dovish shift so far this year, which some believe has further to run given this year’s review of policy. From a global perspective, this dovish Fed shift is potentially destabilizing. If the Fed succeeds in running the economy hot, longer-term yields will rise, a downside risk to our already more cautious EM capital flow projections.

Last year’s sudden stop in the BoP gave rise to a severe credit crunch, cutting the current account deficit and reducing external vulnerability. But the credit expansion in Q1 of this year undid a lot of that progress. We see much of recent Lira weakness through this credit-focused lens. The way forward lies in shifting Turkey away from credit-led growth.

Another credit expansion has been underway during Q1 of this year, and again coincided with rising volatility in the $/TRY exchange rate. Volatile markets necessitate a shift away from credit-driven growth, to a new growth model with an emphasis on structural reforms.

After a decade of super easy monetary policy in the G-3 countries, our data show that an EM positioning overhang may have built up, with successive dovish Fed shifts becoming less and less EM positive. Setting aside China, this latest rebound in flows to EM looks weak, with only Indonesia and Mexico seeing meaningful Q1 inflows.

We have unveiled a new database on EM real money positioning. We begin to add bank-intermediated flows to our database, which comove with real money flows in Turkey and Argentina. The EM positioning overhang may be greater than initially assumed.

We backtest our valuation signals by looking at subsequent REER moves. We find substantial predictive power in Brazil, India and South Africa,which is where our model currently signals material misalignments.

Our EM FX fair value estimates update prompted lots of questions on the inner workings of our model which we lay out in a series of equations and a summary table in this piece.

This Global Macro Views updates our fair value estimates for EM FX, incorporating large exchange rate, current account and activity moves. Argentina’s Peso and the Turkish Lira are only mildly expensive here, while India, Indonesia and South Africa remain overvalued in FX terms. EM Asia continues to be significantly undervalued, including China.

We unveiled our EM FX valuation framework one year ago today, which signaled substantial overvaluations for Argentina and Turkey. Our model says that both currencies have converged to near fair value. But neither is cheap as current account adjustment is mostly cyclical.

The Fed is likely to reignite a wall of money to emerging markets, and our high frequency tracking of flows already shows a sharp spike. As the hunt for yield restarts, positioning in EM is a central question. South Africa is most over-, Brazil and Russia most under-positioned.

Our high frequency trackers show a substantial pick-up in flows, though the underlying picture is weaker than headline numbers suggest. The rebound is concentrated in China, with Mexico and Indonesia also up, while the flow picture to India, South Africa, Turkey and Thailand is weak, even after large outflows during the emerging markets sell-off last year.

Our trackers do not point to a convincing pick-up in flows beyond China, with flows to key emerging markets like India and South Africa quite weak, even after sizeable and persistent outflows during last year’s EM sell-off.

Not much has changed in the macro landscape, but markets have shifted to price an end to the hiking cycle. In effect, the Fed has become a casualty of the trade war, and further tightening (which we expect) is now harder.

We see global growth worries as overblown. US data are catching down with elsewhere, but that was inevitable and to be expected, a normal sign of global business cycle swings. We lower our growth forecasts modestly, but continue to see a solid overall picture.

Lesson #1: Don’t engineer an outsize credit boom into a global tightening cycle. Lesson #2: Current account-based estimates of FX fair value are really important. Lesson #3: After a decade of G-3 monetary easing, EM has a positioning overhang. Lesson #4: Imposing a tariff on China is a negative shock that weakens the RMB. Lesson #5: Don’t get hung up on stories the Fed is shifting hawkish. It isn’t.

We have introduced a new measure of real money positioning in EM, which extends the IIF’s well-known work on capital flows to positioning. Our positioning data are calibrated to match stock positions in the BoP, so by construction are representative of the full positioning picture.

Foreign capital flows to EM are a key, but incomplete, part of the positioning story, since they capture buying and selling, but not all the valuation changes in between. We unveil a new database that adds valuation changes to our existing flows work, giving, to our knowledge, the most complete and up-to-date EM positioning snapshot.

2018 has been a difficult year for many emerging markets, but sentiment has recently shifted more positive in many cases, reflecting cheap valuations, a dovish Fed, and a China-US trade "truce." With sentiment more positive, market focus is squarely on positioning, with people asking how much positioning was cut during the EM sell-off. We develop new data that give a comprehensive look at EM positioning, combining IIF work on capital flows with valuation changes on the stock, where the latter historically account for the bulk of positioning changes.

This year’s EM sell-off underscored the importance of FX valuation with markets, in dramatic fashion, going after meaningful FX overvaluations. At this point, our models signal neutral or cheap valuations for much of EM, so that currency misalignments are less of a risk factor as we approach 2019. But a positioning overhang in emerging markets remains a material risk factor, given the intensity of capital flows to EM resulting from G-3 monetary stimulus. This piece starts a series of Global Macro Views on EM flows and positioning, which we kick off today by looking at flows over the EM sell-off this summer.

Euro periphery current account balances have almost all swung into surplus, which is often cited as positive evidence that competitiveness has been restored. But the swing from current account deficit to surplus has a cyclical component, reflecting depressed import volumes due to still large output gaps in some cases. We estimate cyclically-adjusted balances for a range of output gap estimates. Adjusting for slack, Euro periphery current accounts are likely still in deficit.

The Euro zone current account balance is in sizeable surplus, which some see as a sign the Euro is undervalued and needs to rise. But the headline surplus in part reflects persistently large output gaps, which may be inflating the external balance by depressing import volumes. We derive a cyclically-adjusted current account balance for the Euro zone, which turns out to be negative, potentially signaling Euro overvaluation.

Estimates for Euro periphery output gaps are oddly small, even where real GDP has fallen substantially in the last 10 years. These estimates implicitly assume lots of activity is permanently lost, with potential "bending" down, almost as if to validate low actual GDP. The reality is that economic slack on the periphery is likely still sizeable, and holding down underlying inflation despite unprecedented ECB easing.

China's current account has traditionally registered large surpluses, but has swung into deficit this year based on data from Q1 through Q3, adding to the case that the RMB could be overvalued and needs to depreciate.

EM Asian currencies have historically exhibited "fear of floating," with many countries using official intervention to stabilize exchange rates. W.

Turkey over the summer experienced a large negative credit impulse, driven by the "sudden stop" in the balance of payments in early August. Exter.

Markets are fixated on 7.00 as an important threshold for $/CNY, thinking a move through that level could signal competitive devaluation. But the f.

Waiting for higher wage inflation has been like watching paint dry. That is about to change with October data on average hourly earnings. A large base.

We turned more constructive on emerging markets some weeks ago, given that the EM sell-off eliminated some of the biggest FX overvaluations. But a.

In the wake of the latest escalation in China-US trade tensions, RMB has not resumed its sharp devaluation from a few months ago. This is because t.

This year began with large currency overvaluations in Argentina and Turkey, but the Peso and the Lira are at this point undervalued, the latter sig.

We compare FM to EM across key macroeconomic outcomes. FM grew less than EM in the long run but saw lower volatility. FM fell behind in convergence to.

Argentina's Peso and the Turkish Lira have weakened substantially, with increasing concern in markets over potential contagion to other EMs. Non-re.

The Lira has fallen 30 percent in real terms in recent years, after trend depreciating in real terms for many years prior to that. We screen EM for.

The recent Lira sell-off follows many years of trend depreciation, such that the currency is now materially undervalued in our models. Turkey's bal.

Early this year we signaled rising EM risk , especially for Argentina and Turkey. We also flagged growing potential for contagion to the broader EM co.

We scanned EM for external vulnerability earlier this year, and found risk was the highest in Argentina and Turkey. We develop a companion toolkit.

Changes in China's FX regime have been associated with capital outflows, notably the 2014 band widening and the "step" devaluation in August 2015.

A central debate in markets continues to be whether the Dollar will rise or fall. This debate tends to brush over the fact that there are two versions.

The recent RMB devaluation is raising fears a currency war is imminent. RMB declines have undone strength from early 2018, a natural up and down. But.

A distinction is often made between hot money and more stable capital flows. We examine which non-resident capital flows to EM look most like hot mone.

Many emerging markets have sold off sharply this year, and a hawkish shift from the Fed could add fuel to the fire. We examine Fed policy through t.

Why has there not been a more pronounced rise in inflation, "¦ given that standard indicators of slack point to a tight economy? One possibility is th.

The RMB had been on the sidelines of growing trade tensions, but its recent weakness is raising fears of competitive devaluation. We continue to th.

Early this year we warned of large FX overvaluations in Argentina and Turkey. With both currencies having fallen a lot, we update our EM FX valuation.

We recently examined the pattern of EM flows to emerging markets, where our innovation was to control for the role of reinvested earnings, which.

We document the resilience of Euro zone bank deposits during past stress episodes. There is only one major Euro zone economy - Greece - where deposit.

We recently estimated an annual financing need around $15 bn for Argentina, on benign assumptions for the current account, debt rollover and capita.

Foreign direct investment flows to EM look different than you think. This is because reinvested earnings constitute much of the FDI flow to EM, whe.

The EM sell-off has been large for Argentina and Turkey, which raises the risk of contagion to the broader EM complex. We examine non-resident port.

EMs with large external funding needs are under pressure. The Turkish Lira is one of the currencies in focus. We present external funding scenarios to.

The Argentinian Peso and Turkish Lira have fallen sharply this year, but spillovers to the broader emerging markets complex have been limited. We e.

We have been writing on the growing vulnerabilities across EM, where we have been focused on two countries: Turkey and Argentina . Given recent dev.

Labor force attachment has been studied extensively for DMs, "¦ where participation has risen among women and older workers. We document key trends in.

Mounting trade tensions reflect past and present currency manipulation. We document the "fear of floating" that exists in countries across EM Asia, ..

Demonetization and GST were quasi-natural experiments, with profound and long-lasting impacts on the economy. This meant India missed the synchronized global recovery, but a rebound is underway from low initial conditions. Broad money has not recovered fully from demonetization, but credit growth and capital flows will support investment. Easing appreciation pressure will be positive for exports, even though structural competitiveness issues remain.

We have been focused on rising risk to emerging markets, especially where idiosyncratic factors point to vulnerabilities . Official intervention ca.

Argentina's fiscal position worsened under the Kirchner administration. The current government is committed to redressing the situation, and is imp.

Markets are turning less friendly towards carry trades, which is weighing on EMs with large external funding needs. Earlier this year we scanned EM.

We recently introduced a new activity tracker for China. That tracker displays far more swings than the official GDP data. We explore if swings in cre.

We discuss why global growth was so synchronized last year, which we trace back to the Shanghai G20 meeting in February 2016. That meeting followed.

Market pricing remains far below the "dots" in 2019 and 2020, reflecting in part a perception that the Fed is a dovish institution. We examine past.

China's real GDP growth has been very stable since 2015, unlike its main trading partners, which continue to see normal variability. A new activity.

The mapping from wider fiscal deficits to the current account has been imperfect, reflecting offsetting moves in other sectors of the economy and a.

One month ago, average hourly earnings surprised to the upside, sparking anxiety that the US economy may - finally - be starting to overheat. We ar.

Last year we published a series of reports on red versus blue states, "¦ which showed that red state labor markets are materially lagging blue ones. W.

We develop a measure of core capital flows for Saudi Arabia, which has a similar intuition to widely-used core inflation metrics. Core CPI strips o.

Longer-term Treasury yields have risen sharply year-to-date. A key question for markets is whether the sell-off will continue. We examine the various.

Market volatility and global interest rates have risen sharply, "¦ a challenge for emerging markets dependent on external financing. We scan the emerg.

FROG s ( F rivolously R elated O utput G aps) are oddly small output gap estimates, "¦ which reflect potential GDP bending down to meet years of weak.

In a Global Macro Views in December we introduced BoP Nowcasts, "¦ which map commodity prices and capital flows into daily forecasts for the 2018 BoP.

Global trade tensions are on the rise, "¦ reflecting persistent current account imbalances. The US current account translates into a 10% Dollar overva.

Trade policy is becoming a key area of focus for the administration. We examine the adjustment in the US current account in recent years, looking t.

Earlier this week we introduced the concept of FROGs , where the abbreviation stands for F rivolously R elated O utput G aps. This is a gap that is.

January always brings discussion of key themes for the year ahead. A key theme should be a fundamental re-examination of the output gap. Oddly enough,.

Low inflation has been a conundrum in recent years, "¦ but currently nowhere more so than in the Euro zone and Japan. We evaluate how G-3 inflation ha.

China and Saudi Arabia are key members of the so-called "Dollar block." Both have in recent years experienced large declines in official reserves. In.

Red states are falling behind blue states in the jobs boom. But the divide between red and blue states goes deeper than just job creation. We develop.

We have shown that red states are falling behind blue states in the jobs recovery. We examine three possible drivers: (i) demographics; (ii) opioids;.

We compare the US labor force participation rate to other G10 economies. The decline in the US participation rate is a clear outlier, especially wh.

Red states are falling behind blue states in the labor market recovery, a phenomenon we documented in a Global Macro Views earlier this week. We fo.

Red states are not benefitting the same as blue states from jobs growth, with the nature of th.

The October labor market data on balance were a hawkish signal for the Fed, because the most dovish component - the drop in average hourly earnings gr.

With the announcement of the next Fed Chair expected imminently, there is a lot of speculation over how policy might differ across the various candida.

This week's reduction of asset purchases from the ECB will try to accomplish a "dovish taper," whereby withdrawal of stimulus will likely be accompani.

Concerns about "premature deindustrialization" featured in several panel sessions at our Annual Member Meetings last week. This Global Macro Views pro.

We provide a summary of the topics we have covered since June 2, when we published the first Global Macro Views that was called "The Big Questions." T.

In a recent Global Macro Views , we have shown that this year's drop in US inflation - arguably one of the key macro surprises of 2017 - is to an impo.

EM currencies have sold off since the FOMC meeting on Sep. 20. We evaluate the risk of another "taper tantrum" and discuss how different currencies mi.

We examine how market pricing for key central banks has moved over the past year and update our forecast for the G-3 central banks. We continue to exp.

This GMV revisits some of the themes from our April Global Economic Monitor examining global growth. The upswing in business sentiment since the sta.

We look at where export volumes out- or underperformed relative to fluctuations in the real exchange rate, controlling also for changes in global grow.

We expect an uptick in inflation in coming months, due to a normalization of the price path for specific PCE elements. The drivers behind this process.

We have shown that large movements in a handful of categories have thrown off inflation readings in the US and the Euro zone. We look for similar dist.

We look more closely at the recent pick up in core inflation, and find that much of it can be explained by just three sectors, all related to tourism.

We update our assessment of the labor market following the latest round of data for August. ' We project the U-3 unemployment rate in a range of 4.0 -.

We showcase the importance of Global Value Chains (GVCs) for world trade. Using granular trade data, we determine that US trade balance with the rest.

We examine how EM reserve accumulation has fared in recent years. We compare the average pace of reserve accumulation from 2010 - 2014 to that since t.

Ahead of the Jackson Hole Symposium, we discuss the tensions facing the Fed. Markets are expecting a slightly hawkish outcome given how dovish market.

We update our model for the USD/CNY fix, concluding that USD/CNY could still fix lower for some time, given that the RMB in trade-weighted terms is st.

We dig deeper into services exports, and consider what the growing importance of services trade will mean for the global economy. Using a new dataset.

The striking slowdown in world trade growth over the past five years has been the subject of much research. In the first of a two-part series on trade.

We provide some background for the discussion on taxing foreign held income. We document the size and nature of reinvested earnings that US-based firm.

Since our initial piece, the participation rate has drifted up, a trend that - should it continue - would tend to slow further declines in the unemplo.

We start to examine why average hourly earnings growth is so low. We show that the degree of dispersion in wage growth across sectors has risen, even.

Download PDF (203.81 KB) IIF Authors.

We focus on sovereign financing requirements for Euro Area countries. Using data on debt issuance and maturity, Italy stands out among the euro-area c.

We examine the decline in core PCE inflation, looking at individual components within the inflation basket. We find that the decline can be accounted.

We examine how rising global interest rates might impact growth in emerging markets, differentiating between countries where growth has been consumpti.

We examine the labor market "churn" and perform a sensitivity analysis on the US unemployment rate. Factoring in some slowing in hiring and a gradual.

The Euro zone is a unique opportunity to examine Phillips curves at the country level. We examine for which countries within the Euro zone the Phillip.

We look at the maturity dimension of central bank asset purchases. We show how the average maturity of central bank bond holdings has been evolving, a.

Why is Retail Employment Falling so Sharply? We examine whether changing shopping habits can explain large job losses. Our results show that the subs.

The ECB's ability to extend its purchase program beyond 2017 will be limited by a lack of public-sector debt eligible for purchase under the public-se.

Mr. Phillips Goes to Washington In the aftermath of the Fed meeting, and following our previous analysis, we show that the Phillips curve plays an im.

This GMV begins our look at how QE affected balance sheets, by compiling flow of funds data on supply and demand of government bonds as consistently.

We are able to explain the trajectory of core inflation using a simple list of macro factors - including exchange rate movements, commodity prices and.

Our first piece on the Phillips curves in the G-3 looks at the relationship between labor market slack and core inflation in the US, Japan and the Eur.

We are introducing a new publication, which we are calling Global Macro Views . This product aims to complement existing IIF research, by discussing b.

In the months since the election, the ability of Dollar moves to explain USD/CNY fixings is down sharply.' We interpret this regime change as a de fa.

We estimate a simple model that examines the role that Dollar direction plays in the fixing mechanism. Prior to Nov. 8, the fixing displayed asymmetry.

The sharp decline in the current account surplus,' which fell over $100 billion last year, was driven by a drop in the goods balance, not services.' W.